Three lawsuits challenging the Trump administration’s Section 301 forced-labor tariffs are now running on a single briefing calendar at the US Court of International Trade, and the next fixed date on that calendar is September 15, 2026. That is the deadline for the government’s consolidated response to the plaintiffs’ motions for judgment, according to filings reported by Inside U.S. Trade and Trade Law Daily.
The duties at issue are not narrow. They took effect at 12:01 a.m. on July 24, 2026 and cover 60 economies, 59 countries plus the European Union, which together account for 99.4 percent of US imports. Rates run at 10 percent or 12.5 percent depending on the trading partner.
For retailers and e-commerce sellers, the September date matters for one reason above all others: every entry filed since July 24 carries duties that a court could later order refunded. Whether a given importer sees any of that money back depends on paperwork decisions being made now, not on the eventual ruling.
In short
- September 15, 2026 is the government’s deadline to file its consolidated response to plaintiffs’ motions for judgment in the Section 301 forced-labor tariff litigation.
- The tariffs cover 60 economies representing 99.4 percent of US imports, at 10 percent or 12.5 percent, effective July 24, 2026.
- Three separate cases now share a schedule: Burlap and Barrel v. United States (the master case), State of Oregon v. Trump (25 states), and a Learning Resources group case.
- The states plead three counts under the Administrative Procedure Act and Article I, arguing USTR exceeded its statutory authority and acted arbitrarily.
- Duties keep accruing during the litigation. Refund eligibility depends on entry-level preservation steps that importers control today.
What the September 15 deadline actually decides
The September 15 filing is the government’s substantive defense of the tariff program, submitted in one consolidated brief covering all three challenges. It is the first time the administration will have to justify the forced-labor action on a full record rather than in a press release.
The procedural route to that date was itself contested. In an August 4 motion at the Court of International Trade, the government asked the court to designate Burlap and Barrel v. United States, CIT number 26-03345, as the master case, directing all plaintiffs to file there with coordinated briefing and oral argument on the same schedule but without formal consolidation.
The court granted a plaintiffs’ motion setting the joint schedule, per Inside U.S. Trade. That approach keeps the three complaints legally distinct while forcing them onto one clock, which speeds the path to a merits ruling considerably.
Under the proposed scheduling order, plaintiffs’ motions for judgment were due August 14, 2026, with the government’s consolidated response due September 15. Oral argument would follow on a coordinated basis. Separately, the docket in the states’ case lists an answer due date of October 2, 2026, according to court records summarized by Barnes Richardson & Colburn.
None of this suspends collection. The duties remain in effect and US Customs and Border Protection continues to collect them, a posture that mirrors what happened during the earlier IEEPA refund class litigation that left 330,000 importers waiting while the legal question worked its way through the court.
How the forced-labor tariffs were built in four months
The compressed timeline is central to the legal fight, so the sequence is worth setting out precisely. It runs from March to July 2026, which is fast by the standards of Section 301 practice.
The investigation clock
USTR initiated Section 301 investigations into 60 of the largest US trading partners on March 12, 2026. The stated basis was each economy’s failure to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on importing goods produced with forced labor.
On June 2, 2026, USTR proposed tariffs of 10 percent or 12.5 percent across all 60 trading partners, with exceptions for certain categories of goods. The proposal was published in the Federal Register on June 5, 2026 with a request for comments.
Final action came on July 23, 2026, announced by US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer. The duties took effect the next day and were published at 91 Fed. Reg. 47,318. Start to finish, that is roughly four and a half months from initiation to collection, and about two and a half months from initiation to the determination itself.
The rate bands
The final action did not apply a flat rate. Per the USTR announcement, 17 economies that already maintain forced-labor import prohibitions or hold reciprocal trade agreements with the United States received the lower 10 percent band.
That group covers Argentina, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Canada, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United Kingdom. A second treatment applies to the European Union, Taiwan, Japan, Korea and Switzerland, at 10 percent or 12.5 percent net of the MFN rate on certain non-exempted products. All other investigated economies sit at 12.5 percent.
The exclusion carve-outs
USTR built five exemption categories into the action. They cover raw materials not available domestically, products whose tariffing would cause economy-wide disruption, items unobtainable domestically in sufficient quantity or at reasonable prices, certain products where an exemption encourages compliance, and articles where a tariff would not substantially help eliminate the targeted practices.
Those carve-outs matter commercially, because they are the mechanism by which a specific retail category can fall outside the duty entirely. They also feature in the litigation, since the states argue the exemption structure is untethered from any forced-labor finding.
Which importers pay what
The table below sets out the rate structure as announced. Importers should confirm treatment at the ten-digit HTSUS line rather than by country alone, because the non-exempted product lists do the real work for several major partners.
| Band | Economies | Rate | Basis given |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lower band | 17 economies including Canada, Mexico, India, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Cambodia, UK | 10% | Existing forced-labor import prohibitions or reciprocal trade agreements |
| Net-of-MFN band | European Union, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, Switzerland | 10% or 12.5% net of MFN | Applied to certain non-exempted products |
| Standard band | All other investigated economies | 12.5% | Default rate under the final action |
| Exempt | Goods meeting one of five exclusion criteria | 0% | Raw material scarcity, disruption, availability, compliance incentive, ineffectiveness |
Coverage of 99.4 percent of US imports means the practical question for most retail supply chains is not whether the tariff applies but which band applies and whether an exclusion reaches the specific article. Sourcing teams that shifted volume between Asian suppliers to manage earlier duties will find the forced-labor action largely rate-flattening across those origins.
That flattening effect is different in kind from the targeted duties covered in our reporting on the China overcapacity tariff and its 20 percent cap, which concentrates pressure on specific sectors rather than spreading a floor across nearly all origins.
What the 25 states argue
State of Oregon v. Trump, Court number 26-03467, was filed on August 3, 2026 by the attorneys general or governors of 25 states, co-led by Oregon, Arizona and California. New York Attorney General Letitia James and Governor Kathy Hochul announced New York’s participation.
The complaint pleads three counts. Each attacks a different layer of the tariff action, and together they ask the court to vacate the measure outright rather than trim it.
Count I: action beyond the statute
The first count invokes 5 U.S.C. sections 706(2)(A) and 706(2)(C), arguing USTR exceeded its statutory authority. The states contend Section 301 requires action calibrated to eliminate the specific conduct identified in a particular country, not a simultaneous levy on nearly every trading partner.
The argument leans on the structure of the statute. Section 301, codified at 19 U.S.C. sections 2411 to 2420, is built around country-specific investigation and consultation, which is difficult to reconcile with a determination covering 60 economies at once.
Count II: arbitrary and capricious
The second count runs under the familiar arbitrary and capricious standard in 5 U.S.C. section 706(2)(A). The states raise three specific defects: the rates were not tied to the prevalence of forced labor in any given economy, substantive public comments went unanswered, and no mechanism exists for a country to obtain relief by fixing the underlying problem.
That last point is the sharpest. As reported by Supply Chain Dive, the states argue the 10 percent floor holds regardless of what a country does to combat forced labor, which they say severs any rational connection between the remedy and the stated harm.
Count III: ultra vires and Article I
The third count argues the action is ultra vires because the tariff power belongs to Congress under Article I, Section 8. This is the constitutional backstop: even if the statute could be read to permit the action, the states say that reading would place the measure outside what Congress may delegate.
The states seek an order vacating and setting aside the tariff action, a declaration that it is unlawful, refunds of duties paid, plus costs and attorney fees. Standing rests on direct harm, since the states import goods subject to the tariffs and buy imported goods from vendors passing the cost along.
Why the pretext argument matters most
The most consequential allegation is not any single APA count. It is the claim that forced labor was a pretext for continuing a tariff program the courts had already rejected twice.
The sequence supports the states’ framing. On February 20, 2026, the Supreme Court invalidated the administration’s tariff program under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, holding that IEEPA does not authorize tariffs. The administration then turned to Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, imposing a temporary 10 percent surcharge under Proclamation 11012.
Section 122 comes with hard statutory limits: a surcharge of up to 15 percent for no more than 150 days. In May 2026, according to a Holland & Knight analysis, the Court of International Trade invalidated the Section 122 tariffs, holding the administration had not based them on the “large and serious” balance-of-payments deficits Congress contemplated in 1974. That permanent injunction reached only the plaintiff importers and Washington State, leaving collection intact for everyone else.
The Section 122 authority expired on July 24, 2026 under the 150-day clock. The Section 301 forced-labor duties took effect the same day. The states argue that same-day handover, combined with public statements from Ambassador Greer and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent promising continuity at the same rates, demonstrates continuity of the tariff rather than remediation of forced labor.
| Authority | Rate imposed | Statutory limit | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| IEEPA (2025) | 10% global | No tariff power, per the Court | Struck down by the Supreme Court, February 20, 2026 |
| Section 122, Trade Act of 1974 | 10% surcharge (Proclamation 11012) | 15% ceiling, 150 days maximum | Invalidated at the CIT in May 2026; expired July 24, 2026 |
| Section 232, Trade Expansion Act of 1962 | Sector-specific | Requires a Commerce national security finding | Active on specific sectors |
| Section 301, forced labor (2026) | 10% or 12.5% on 60 economies | No maximum rate; 4-year automatic termination | In effect; under challenge, response due September 15, 2026 |
The pattern in that table is what gives the pretext argument its force. Each authority carries a different constraint, and the program’s rate has stayed near 10 percent throughout. Our earlier coverage of how the trade court upheld the de minimis repeal shows the CIT is willing to sustain executive trade measures when the statutory fit is clean, which cuts against reading these challenges as automatic wins for the plaintiffs.
What the Congressional Research Service flagged before the suits landed
A Congressional Research Service legal sidebar dated July 21, 2026 set out the legal vulnerabilities two days before the final action was announced. It is not advocacy, and it reads as a fair map of where the litigation will actually turn.
CRS identified four pressure points. First, whether a foreign government’s failure to prevent forced-labor imports is an actionable act, policy or practice under the statute at all. Second, whether such a failure amounts to the “persistent pattern of conduct” the statute contemplates.
Third, the major questions doctrine: whether tariffing most US imports is an unheralded expansion of power that requires clearer congressional authorization. Fourth, whether the administrative record contains substantial evidence and whether USTR adequately addressed public comments.
CRS also noted two structural features that favor the government. Section 301 vests the authority in USTR rather than the President and sets no maximum tariff rate, which removes the kind of numeric ceiling that doomed the Section 122 action. Actions terminate automatically after four years unless extended on request.
On review, the Court of International Trade has exclusive jurisdiction over initial challenges, with appeals to the Federal Circuit. The governing standard is the APA test that agency action must not be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.
How refunds would work if the tariffs fall
This is where the September date converts into a commercial decision. A vacatur would not automatically move money to every importer that paid.
The Section 122 outcome is the cautionary precedent. The CIT’s permanent injunction benefited only the named plaintiff importers and Washington State. Everyone else kept paying while the ruling suggested broader refund opportunities might become available later.
The mechanics also lag badly at scale. In the IEEPA refund program, CBP has accepted over $132 billion in potential and certified refunds for processing through CAPE, from 272,029 declarations submitted, of which 191,494 passed file validation. Roughly 22,170 refunds totaling about $1.7 billion have not reached Treasury because ACH banking information was never supplied.
CAPE Phase 3, originally scheduled for August 20, has been delayed until further notice. Anyone assuming a court win converts quickly into cash should read that alongside our reporting on how the CBP tariff refund rollout stumbled with 4.36 million entries failing validation.
| Refund step | What it depends on | Importer action required |
|---|---|---|
| Court vacatur | Merits ruling after September 15 briefing | None; wait for the ruling |
| Scope of relief | Whether relief reaches non-plaintiffs | Consider participation or monitoring counsel |
| Entry eligibility | Liquidation status of each entry | Track liquidation; protest or extend as advised |
| Payment mechanics | ACH details on file with CBP | Confirm banking data before any refund window opens |
What a 10 to 12.5 percent floor does to landed cost
The commercial question underneath the legal one is simple: a duty applied to 99.4 percent of US imports behaves less like a tariff and more like a consumption tax on imported goods. That changes how it flows through a retail P&L.
A targeted tariff can be engineered around. Sourcing teams shift origin, requalify a supplier, or reclassify an article. A near-universal floor removes most of those levers, leaving only three responses: absorb the cost, pass it through, or change the product.
Where the margin actually goes
On a good landed at $10 from a 12.5 percent band economy, the duty adds $1.25 before freight, insurance and any sector-specific measure. At typical specialty retail keystone markups, that is roughly 250 basis points of gross margin if fully absorbed, or a mid-single-digit shelf price increase if fully passed through.
Neither extreme is what usually happens. The pattern visible in second-quarter retail reporting through August has been partial pass-through concentrated in newness and opening price points, with legacy SKUs held at shelf to protect traffic. That approach defers the margin hit rather than avoiding it.
Categories with the thinnest cushion are the exposed ones: consumables, basic apparel, and low-ticket hardlines where the absolute dollar price is a purchase trigger. Categories with pricing power, including premium beauty and branded footwear, have more room but face the same cost.
The inventory timing problem
Goods ordered before July 24, 2026 were costed against a different duty assumption. For long lead-time categories, that mispricing works through the P&L for two to three quarters after the effective date rather than landing at once.
The litigation adds a second layer of uncertainty on top of that. A retailer that raises prices to recover the duty and then sees the tariff vacated has to decide whether to unwind the increase, and price decreases are considerably harder to execute than increases.
That asymmetry argues for treating any refund as upside rather than budgeting it. The companies that guided most conservatively on tariff recovery in the August reporting season are the ones with the least to unwind if the September briefing leads nowhere.
Why the September date is a planning input, not a trading signal
Holiday assortments for 2026 are already committed. Nothing decided in this litigation changes the duty paid on goods arriving between now and December, because even a favorable ruling would arrive after the peak season inventory has landed.
The date matters for 2027 planning and for the size of the receivable an importer might eventually book. Treating it as a near-term cost event misreads the calendar.
How the forced-labor action stacks with the rest of the 2026 duty load
Retail importers are not managing this tariff in isolation. The forced-labor duty sits on top of MFN rates, Section 232 sector duties, antidumping and countervailing orders where applicable, and a set of newer measures with their own effective dates.
The interaction that matters most is the textile carve-out. The same Section 301 forced-labor framework produced a tariff-rate quota structure for apparel, which we covered in detail when the USTR textile quota landed on September 1 tying apparel duty to US cotton. Apparel importers therefore face both the headline rate and a quota mechanic on the same entries.
Landed cost models built before July 24 are now wrong for most origins. The practical exposure is concentrated in categories with thin gross margins and long lead times, where the goods on the water were priced against the prior duty assumption.
There is a second-order effect worth naming. Because the forced-labor duty applies a floor across nearly all origins, it compresses the arbitrage between sourcing countries that drove much of the 2025 and early 2026 supplier reshuffling. Origin switching still moves the rate between the 10 and 12.5 percent bands, but it no longer moves the duty to zero.
What retailers and e-commerce sellers should do before September 15
The litigation calendar does not require importers to do anything. Preserving optionality on refunds does. The steps below are administrative rather than strategic, and they are the ones that become impossible to take retroactively.
Track liquidation on every affected entry
Refund eligibility generally turns on whether an entry is still open. Entries liquidate on a schedule, and once liquidation becomes final the path to recovery narrows sharply regardless of what a court later holds.
Importers should build an entry register covering everything filed from July 24, 2026 forward, flagging the duty paid under the forced-labor action separately from other duty lines. That separation is what makes a later refund claim computable.
Confirm the classification and the exclusion analysis
The five exclusion categories are the only route to a zero rate. Whether a given article qualifies is a ten-digit HTSUS question, not a country question, and the analysis should be documented contemporaneously rather than reconstructed later.
Misclassification carries its own risk in the current enforcement climate. CBP has been tightening the administrative perimeter, including the move to void importer of record numbers from September 18 where Form 5106 data is inaccurate, which can strand cargo at the port independent of any tariff question.
Get the banking data right now
The $1.7 billion of IEEPA refunds sitting undelivered for want of ACH information is the clearest available lesson. Confirming banking details with CBP costs nothing and removes a failure mode that has already stalled thousands of payments.
Decide whether to be a plaintiff or a spectator
The Section 122 precedent, where relief reached only named plaintiffs and one state, is a live risk here. Companies with material exposure should take advice on whether participation is warranted, because the difference between the two postures may be the difference between a refund and a footnote.
What to watch after September 15
Once the government files, the case moves to oral argument on the coordinated schedule. The court has not published an argument date, and the states’ case separately carries an October 2, 2026 answer deadline on its own docket.
Three signals will indicate which way the merits are trending. The first is how the government defends the rate-setting methodology, specifically whether it can point to record evidence linking each band to forced-labor prevalence. That is the weakest link the states identified and the one CRS flagged as a substantial-evidence problem.
The second is whether the government engages the major questions doctrine directly or argues around it. A brief that treats the doctrine as inapplicable to trade statutes is making a bet the Supreme Court’s February 2026 IEEPA reasoning does not carry over.
The third is whether the court signals anything about the scope of relief. Any indication that a vacatur would run beyond the named plaintiffs would change the calculus for thousands of importers currently watching from the sidelines.
Official documentation of the underlying action, including the rate bands and exclusion criteria, is published on the USTR press release for the forced-labor Section 301 investigations.
A ruling is unlikely before late 2026 on this schedule, and an appeal to the Federal Circuit is close to certain whichever way it goes. Importers planning around a clean resolution inside the current fiscal year are planning around the optimistic case.
Frequently asked questions
What exactly happens on September 15, 2026?
The US government must file its consolidated response to the plaintiffs’ motions for judgment in the Section 301 forced-labor tariff litigation at the Court of International Trade. It is a briefing deadline, not a ruling date, and no decision is expected that day.
Which tariffs are being challenged?
The Section 301 forced-labor duties that took effect at 12:01 a.m. on July 24, 2026, published at 91 Fed. Reg. 47,318. They apply at 10 percent or 12.5 percent to 60 economies, 59 countries plus the European Union, covering 99.4 percent of US imports.
Who filed the lawsuits?
Three sets of plaintiffs. Spice importer Burlap and Barrel and watch importer Collective Horology filed on July 24, 2026, in what is now the master case, CIT number 26-03345. Twenty-five states co-led by Oregon, Arizona and California filed State of Oregon v. Trump, Court number 26-03467, on August 3, 2026. A group including Learning Resources filed a third case.
Are the tariffs suspended while the case proceeds?
No. The duties remain in effect and CBP continues to collect them. No merits ruling has issued, and no court has enjoined collection generally.
If the tariffs are struck down, do all importers get refunds?
Not automatically. When the Court of International Trade invalidated the Section 122 tariffs in May 2026, the permanent injunction reached only the plaintiff importers and Washington State. Refund scope is a separate question from the merits, and entry liquidation status affects eligibility.
What is the legal basis for the states’ challenge?
Three counts. Exceeding statutory authority under 5 U.S.C. sections 706(2)(A) and 706(2)(C); arbitrary and capricious action under section 706(2)(A); and ultra vires action encroaching on the tariff power committed to Congress under Article I, Section 8.
Why do the states say forced labor was a pretext?
Because the Section 301 duties took effect on July 24, 2026, the same day the Section 122 surcharge expired under its 150-day statutory limit, and because the investigations covering 60 economies were completed in roughly two and a half months. The states also cite statements from Ambassador Jamieson Greer and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent promising continuity at the same rates.
Which goods are exempt from the forced-labor tariffs?
USTR set five exclusion categories: raw materials unavailable domestically, products whose tariffing would cause economy-wide disruption, items unobtainable domestically in sufficient quantity or at reasonable prices, certain products where exemption encourages compliance, and articles where a tariff would not substantially help eliminate the targeted practices. Eligibility is determined at the ten-digit HTSUS level.
What should an importer do right now?
Build an entry register from July 24, 2026 forward with the forced-labor duty broken out as a separate line, track liquidation status on those entries, document the classification and exclusion analysis contemporaneously, and confirm ACH banking details are on file with CBP so any future refund can actually be paid.